Posts Tagged ‘News’

Adobe Releases Patch for Critical Flash Vulnerability (May 4, 2012)

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Adobe has issued a patch for a zero-day flaw in Flash Player that is being actively exploited in targeted attacks.......

Adobe Flash Player 11.3 Beta Offers Silent Updates for Macs, Sandboxing for Firefox (May 7, 2012)

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Adobe has released a beta version of Flash Player that includes silent updates for Mac OS X.......

Apple Releases iOS Update (May 7, 2012)

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Apple has issued an update for iOS, its mobile operating system, to address four security issues in its browser.......

DHS Alerts Warn of Concerted Cyber Attack on Natural Gas Pipeline Companies (May 5, 2012)

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According to alerts issued by the US Department of Homeland Security, an active cyber attack is targeting systems at US companies responsible for the country's natural gas pipeline.......

FBI Wants to Expand CALEA’s Purview to Cover Internet Companies (May 4, 2012)

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The FBI wants Internet companies such as Google and Facebook to allow backdoors in their systems to allow government surveillance.......

NSA Director Says Critical Infrastructure Companies Should be Required to Implement Security Measures (May 4, 2012)

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General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and commander of US Cyber Command, wants legislators to enact laws that require companies supporting elements of the country's critical infrastructure, such as power and transportation, to implement strong and effective cyber security measures.......

iOS 5 Gadgets: Fun Toys That Can Mess With Enterprise Security

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NEWS ANALYSIS: Apple's latest update to iOS not only fixes serious security vulnerabilities, but also serves to remind us that a lot of potentially buggy little gadgets are carrying corporate data. - Apple's latest update to iOS, iOS 5.1.1 fixes three serious security problems within the family of Mac personal gadgets, iPhone, iPod Touch and iPad. Owners of these gadgets should make it a priority to apply the patch. Today's patch, if you haven't already gotten to it, addresses a number of issue...

AppSense Makes BYOD Specialist RAPsphere Its First Acquisition

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The addition of RAPsphere will give the AppSense platform greater BYOD controls and improved management of enterprise users, the company said. - Virtualized desktop system provider AppSense on May 8 announced that it has acquired RAPsphere, a maker of software that enables CIOs to embrace BYOD in the enterprise while protecting corporate applications and data on mobile devices. BYOD signifies quot;bring your own device, quot; which large n...

Samsung, HTC Epitomize Challenge to Differentiate Android Smartphones

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Android-supporting smartphone makers have vowed to make fewer but more distinctive devices in an effort to compete in a market that already offers business users and consumers many different options. Increasing numbers of smartphones, in increasing sizes& not to mention names that echo or build on earlier models& can make the options seem a blur of deep-black displays, curving design work and multicore processors. How can a user differentiate? Which is the right smartphone to get? Here, eWEEK brought together three newer Android phones, each running 4.0, or Ice Cream Sandwich (ICS), and capable of running on a Long-Term Evolution (LTE) network. While each has features that bring the others to mind, these smartphones also have details that set them apart. The HTC One X went on sale on the AT&T network May 6 for $199. The Samsung Galaxy S III was introduced May 3 and will arrive in the United States this summer, though carrier news and pricing are still unknown. And from the CTIA Wireless show in New Orleans, which started May 7, Verizon introduced the HTC Droid Incredible 4G LTE, which will arrive in "the coming weeks" at a price that's yet to be determined. Are these phones distinct enough? Would a user switch networks for one? Alternately, could a $50 price tag, or possibly a waning interest in Android, get you to consider the Samsung Focus 2? Running Microsoft Windows Mobile 7.5, it was also introduced May 7. - ...

Incident-response without NTP, (Tue, May 8th)

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While we patiently await the arrival of this month's patches from Microsoft (and everyone else who publishes today) I have a little thought experiment for you. We all know that the internet doesn't work too efficiently if DNS isn't working or present. NTP is just as critical for your security infrastructure. Without reliable clock synchronization, piecing together what happened during an incident can become extremely difficult.

Consider a hypothetical services network and DMZ: there's an external firewall, a couple of webservers, an inner firewall with a database server behind it. Let's also assume that something bad happened to the webservers a couple of months ago and you've been brought in as a consultant to piece together the order of events and figure out what the attacker did. The web administration team, and the database team, and the firewall team have all provided your request for logs and you've got them on your system of choice.
More About NTP
For a complete background on NTP I recommend: http://www.ntp.org/ntpfaq
There are two main types of clock error that we are concerned with in this example:

Clock Skew an error of 0.001% causes a clock to be off by nearly one second per day. We can expect most clocks to have one second of drift every 2 days. The oscillator used in computer clocks can be influenced by changes in local temperature, and the quality of the electricity feeding the system. Update: Joanne wrote in to point out that the accuracies that I've cited in this paragraph are an order of magnitude better than what one would expect in computer hardware. We'll see later in some example data how optimistic my values were.
Today's Challenge

How do you begin order the events between the systems? First I'll solicit general approaches via comments and email, later I'll summarize and provide some example data to illustrate the most popular/promising approaches.
Example Data
Let's take a look at what the web team and the firewall team sent to us.


Date Time Event Epoch

Web1:

1/1/1972 13:24:04 First Request from badguy 262990.55837962962963

1/1/1972 13:24:04 2nd Request from badguy 262990.55837962962963

1/1/1972 13:24:04 3rd Request from badguy 262990.55837962962963

1/1/1972 13:24:05 4th Request from badguy 262990.558391203703704

1/1/1972 13:24:09 5th Request from badguy 262990.5584375



Web 2:

1/1/1972 13:25:37 First Request from badguy 262990.559456018518519

1/1/1972 13:25:41 2nd Request from badguy 262990.559502314814815

1/1/1972 13:25:57 3rd Request from badguy 262990.5596875

1/1/1972 13:26:49 4th Request from badguy 262990.560289351851852

1/1/1972 13:26:59 5th Request from badguy 262990.560405092592593

1/1/1972 13:27:42 6th Request from badguy 262990.560902777777778



Firewall:

1/1/1972 7:00:41 Accept tcp_80 34153 bad_guy_ip web1 262990.292141203703704

1/1/1972 7:00:43 Accept tcp_80 34154 bad_guy_ip web1 262990.292164351851852

1/1/1972 7:00:45 Accept tcp_80 34155 bad_guy_ip web1 262990.2921875

1/1/1972 7:00:49 Accept tcp_80 34156 bad_guy_ip web1 262990.292233796296296

1/1/1972 7:00:52 Accept tcp_80 34157 bad_guy_ip web1 262990.292268518518518

1/1/1972 7:02:27 Accept tcp_80 59498 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.293368055555556

1/1/1972 7:02:31 Accept tcp_80 59499 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.293414351851852

1/1/1972 7:02:47 Accept tcp_80 59500 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.293599537037037

1/1/1972 7:03:39 Accept tcp_80 59501 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.294201388888889

1/1/1972 7:03:49 Accept tcp_80 59502 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.29431712962963
1/1/1972 7:04:32 Accept tcp_80 59503 bad_guy_ip web2 262990.294814814814815

I've merged added the epoch column since that will help some folks apply their favorite methods and trimmed the logs from the three systems down to the activity of one suspicious IP address.
My Naive Approach
My initial assumption is that we should be able to account for the bias between the clocks on sufficiently-small windows of time. We will not likely come up with a simple formula to correct several months-worth of logs. However, for critical periods, we should be able to knit together log events from multiple systems, identify the clock bias, and account for it in the ultimate investigative timeline. So my approach is to pick a small time-frame of events, pick a system to be the reference point, tie events together manually a bit, and plot it out to see if there is a simple linear relationship, or if we have other issues.
Immediately we see that there's clearly a timezone difference between the web team and the firewall team, that's not a big deal at the moment. Initially we may feel in luck that the firewall can act as a semi-reliable observer to compare the attack against web1 and web2. Maybe fortune will continue and we can simply shift the times a little to account for clock skew. The event was only a few seconds so the window should be small enough that drift should be undetectable, right?
No, something's not right. If we compare the elapsed time of the event for web1 and web2 using the firewall as a frame of reference. While the firewall and web2 agree that it was visited over 2 minutes and 5 seconds, web1 records an elapsed time of 5 seconds, while the firewall indicates 11 between the first accept and the last accept.
Let's plot out the times from the web server vs. the time noted by the firewall. Ideally we should see something of a straight line with a slope of one and a zero-intercept of zero. In this case, we're hoping for a slope near one, and a zero-intercept that will help identify the timezone used by the firewall or the webservers.

How about a closer look at those two:

Web 1 recorded the first few probes as happening in the same second. Over time though (draw a line between the first and last event) and it's a bit more in agreement with web2.

A Side Note About the Comments
The comments strayed off-topic pretty quickly today, but there are some nice gems in there about deploying and monitoring NTP. They're worth a look.

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